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"STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES" 
1. How should the value of property awarded to parties be 
determined. Should fair value of property awarded in the case 
be Market value or distress, give away value. 
2. Should the Plaintiff receive his cash inheitance of $8100.00 
plus interest occurred. In the form it was received and kept. 
3. Did the Plaintiff have sufficient time to do discovery 
and prepare for trial. 
4. Were there excessive attorney fees granted to the 
Defendants attorney. 
5. Should the defendants attorney be able to change the Pre-
trail and Memorandum Decision add the requirement of the 
Plaintiff to pay One-half property taxes and insurance. 
6. Can the defendant adjust her income to affect out come. 
7. Were the defendant#s hidden assets considered in the 
judgement. 
8. Who should be granted grounds for divorce the Plaintiff or 
Defendant. 
9. Does the Plaintiff have .equal rights in selecting 
distribution of assets. 
10. Should the Plaintiff be able to inventory the martial 
assets. 
11. Was the Plaintiff given fair and equatable treatment without 
prejudice when he represented himself in court. 
12. Should the Defendant be awarded permanent alimony, if so how 
long, and how much. 
"DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS" 
Constitutional provisions are should sexual discrimination 
occur in divorce proceedings, and should distribution of 
assets, attorney fees, equal opportunity legal representation, 
and alimony be discriminatory. 
Can an individual has equal justice and fair trial 
regardless of sex. 
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"STATEMENT OF THE CASE" 
The nature of the case is Civil action of divorce filed by 
the Plaintiff. The parties experience difficulties throughout 
their relationship with the Defendant causing verbal and physical 
abuse. The abuse got so excessive and happen so often that r.he 
Plaintiff filed for divorce. 
This case has from the start been drawn out and unnecessary 
length of time. With the counsel and the defendant delaying 
to resolve of the matter through causing excessive attorney fees 
being generated at the expense of the plaintiff. To the extent 
that the plaintiff was bombed out of proper legal counsel. 
The defendant's counsel has made outrageous demands of 
settlement from the start of the case. Therefore making an 
unworkable reasonable settlement. 
Alimony settlement offers were made by the Plaintiff on 
several occasions up to $100 for 2 years. 
The Plaintiff did disclose all assets to his attorney and in 
documents provided to Defendant's attorney did show marital 
funds. 
The matter came forth for trial on 27, September, 1988. At 
the pretrial conference date 26th of September, 1988 the Court 
allowed William R. Russell, Attorney for the Plaintiff, to 
withdraw from representation. 
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During the trial the Plaintiff objected to the following, 
attorney fees for the Defendant, awarding the Camper to the 
Plaintiff, excessive value of tools etc, the form of inheritance 
money was to be awarded, alimony and amount. 
The disposition of the trial court was granting the 
defendant $200 a month alimony, requiring the Plaintiff pay 1/2 
of property taxes and insurance on the marital house, the 
defendant awarded $6800.00 attorneys fees, distribution of 
inherited proceeds to the Plaintiff in the amount of $8100.00 v.as 
in the form of property not cash, and the Court adopted Exhibit 
17-D in the division of property. 
The property settlement was forty per-cent for the 
Plaintiff and Sixty per-cent for the Defendant. 
"SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT" 
Personal Property should be valued by the same method 
market value for the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
The $8100.00 plus interest inheritance should be separate 
property and not considered in property settlement. 
The Plaintiff should have had equal opportunity and 
sufficient time to do discovery work and prepare for trial. 
The excessive attorney fee's generated by the Defendant's 
Counsel should be denied because this kind of case does not 
justify them and the Defendant and her attorney created most the 
fees. The Defendant was responsible for the Divorce. 
The requirement that the Plaintiff pay 1/2 of property :.axes 
and insurance, goes against the pretrial hearing and Memorandum 
Decision. 
Alimony of $200. Month life time is excessive of the 
equalization of income method, and discrimination against the 
oppose sex. The new law's standards of self-sufficiency should 
be upheld. She is capable of being self-sufficient and 
independent. Society doesnft tolerate that from any of us. She 
has the same obligations to take care of herself as we all have. 
The Plaintiff should be granted the divorce if he had 
sufficient grounds since he more grounds for divorce. Acts 
constituting cruel conduct sufficient to cause great mental 
distress to the husband justify grounds. 
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Plaintiff should have had equal rights in choosing personal 
property. 
Plaintiff should be able to inventory personal property 
without it his rights were not protected. 
All persons should be given same fair, and equable 
treatment. Without prejudice in the*Courts regardless of weather 
he is represented by an attorney or not. 
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"ARGUMENT" 
My opinion is that all marital property should be valued by 
the same method. Either at market value or replacement value. 
In regards to the division of property should have been two-
thirds for the Plaintiff and one-third for the Defendant as 
assumption is that the property really belongs to the husband 
because he was the one who really earned it. Talley v Talley 
(1987) (61 p31) 
The Plaintiff should have received $8100 plus interest in 
cash as the funds was received in that form and remained there 
since receiving it. Any change of type of how it was held done 
before filing for divorce. The Plaintiff should not be held 
accountable inheritance money and as secreting funds as they were 
not marital assets. 
The Plaintiff should have had equal opportunity and 
sufficient time to do discovery work to prepare for trial. 
Through-out the case excessive attorney fees have been 
generated by the Defendant's counsel. For example; long 
unnecessary discovery work, numerous telephone calls and letters 
etc. When the Defendant took the camper jacks off of the 
recreational vehicle and claimed the Plaintiff took them off, 
approximately $300 in attorney fee's were generated. Argument 
over whose money was used to pay for the Camper purchased in 
1984. 
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How much was paid for the truck purchased in 1986, and 
where it came from. The Defendant assaulted the Plaintiff and 
then claimed he started it generating more attorney fee's of 
approximately $300. Calculated by the attorney Mr. Dyer from the 
start to misrepresent the facts and set the stage to get all 
attorney fee's he could assuring the Defendant that the Plaintiff 
would be paying most or all attorney fee's he build up fee's. 
Padding and misrepresentation of amounts, time, and 
expenses. 
The Pre-trail and memorandum Decision was changed by the 
Defendants attorney requiring the Plaintiff to pay 1/2 of 
property taxes and insurance. The marital house is paid for and 
therefore has no mortgage. The Plaintiff has paid Property taxes 
and insurance the last two years with no compensation from the 
Defendant. Granting these terms puts an unfair burden upon ~he 
Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is paying out monthly payments to live 
outside the marital home. While the Defendant lives in the horr.e 
Mortgage free. With the Defendant using the Plaintiff assets 
without any compensation or benefits. An objection was raised 
but denied. The equity share of the spouse who does not have the 
presale use of the home should accrue interest at a reasonable 
rate because not using his investment. Eames v Eames (1987) (55 
p49) 
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The Defendant reduced her piece rate income to affect the 
out come of the proceedings. In regards to determine the amount 
of alimony, it should determined by previous gross income for the 
year if the equalization income method is used. 
The new law's standards of self-sufficiency should be upheld. 
She is capable of being self-sufficient and independent. She 
cannot sit back and collect $200.00 per month for the rest of her 
life. Society doesn't tolerate that from any of us. That's why 
we are all employed. She has the same obligation's to take care 
of herself as we all have. 
The Plaintiff believes the Defendant had hidden assets -hat 
were not declared, that would have affected distribution of 
assets. 
The Plaintiff had more grounds for divorce, being he was 
subjected to verbal and physical abuse all throughout the 
marriage and was the reason he filed for divorce. Therefore the 
Plaintiff had more grounds for divorce. Acts constituting cruel 
conduct sufficient to cause great mental distress need not be 
aggravated and more severe when directed toward the husband than 
when directed toward the wife. Hansen v. Hansen. (1975) (537 p 
2d 491) 
The Plaintiff should have equal rights in choosing type and 
what form of martial assets. 
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The Plaintiff should have been able to inventory the martial 
assets because it had been 2 years since he lived at the 
residence and took very little of assets with him in the 
separation. 
The Plaintiff feels that he was not given fair, equable 
treatment and without prejudice when he represented himself in 
Court. He feels he should have equal access to the Courts 
without prejudice even though he is not an attorney. 
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"Conclusion" 
1. The Plaintiff feels that the Martial property should be 
valued at market value, and receive a greater share of martial 
assets. 
2. The Plaintiff also should receive his cash inheritance of 
$8100 plus occurred interest of approximately $1000. And not to 
have it considered in the marital assets to be distributed in any 
way the Defendants attorney wants it to be. 
3. Plaintiff should be allowed to do discovery work. The 
previous attorney he employed did not do sufficient discovery, 
and what information the Defendant and her attorney did not 
provide documents. He should have been allowed sufficient time 
to prepare for a trial and asks that these things be granted tc 
ensure that he received a proper and just trial. 
4. That the excessive attorney fee's granted to the Defendant's 
attorney be denied. 
5. The Plaintiff should not be required to pay any property 
taxes or insurance, and the Plaintiff receive interest on his 
martial investment in the home. 
6. The Defendant's hidden assets be considered in distribution 
of property. 
7. That the Plaintiff be granted divorce as he had more and 
proven grounds for divorce. 
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8. Plaintiff should have some sort of adjustment for not being 
able to inventory assets. 
9. The Plaintiff be granted an equal opportunity to decide in 
distribution of property. 
Therefore, Appellant respectfully requests that this case be 
remanded to the District Court, over rule the Decree of Divorce. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/^~ daY o f March, 1989. 
Bert C. Davis 
Appellant 
6885 So. Redwood Rd. #1209 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BERT C. DAVIS, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CIVIL NO. D-87-3653 
vs. : 
MARJORIE J. DAVIS, : 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial the 27th day of 
September, 1988. The plaintiff appeared pro se, having requested 
of the Court at the pretrial settlement conference set the 26th 
of September, 1988 that the Court allow William R. Russell, 
attorney for the plaintiff, to withdraw from representation. Mr. 
Russell was present at the pretrial conference. The defendant 
was present at pretrial and trial, and was represented-by her 
attorney Phillip W. Dyer. The Court provided the plaintiff with 
substantial leeway in suspending the formal application of the 
Rules of Evidence to allow the plaintiff to present his case pro 
se. Witnesses were called by both parties, and examined and 
cross-examined as appropriate. At the conclusion of the 
evidence, the Court heard closing arguments and took the matter 
under advisement, and now renders this, its Memorandum Decision. 
-A? 
DAVIS V, DAVIS PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. The plaintiff and defendant have been married just 
under 27 years, having been married on the 13th of October, 1961. 
At the time of the marriage the plaintiff was 2 0 years of age, 
and the defendant was 15. Three children have been born as issue 
of the marriage, all of whom are emancipated. 
2. The plaintiff has been employed at Kennecott Copper 
Corporation for a period, according to his testimony, of 29 
years. However, from August of 1985 to April of 1987 he was not 
so employed due to a suspension of continued operations and 
furloughing of employees by the company. 
3. The defendant is employed as a seamstress for Osborne 
Apparel in Magna, Utah. 
4• During the marriage of the parties they vacationed 
regularly. The plaintiff testified that he is entitled to five 
weeks vacation annually. They attended cultural and sporting 
events, and other opportunities consistent with their income. 
(5/\ The plaintiff is employed, and earns approximately 
$1,710.00) per month gross, and the defendant is employed, earning 
approximately>^865. 00 jper month gross. 
6. The plaintiff during the course of this litigation has 
employed two separate attorneys, and has failed to be forthright 
and candid in either disclosing his assets or realistically 
evaluating the case for settlement. The plaintiff intentionally 
failed to disclose $10,100.00 which was converted into travelers 
DAVIS V. DAVIS PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
checks prior to the commencement of this action, and through 
routine discovery was not disclosed. This caused the defendant 
to engage in extensive discovery and investigation to determine 
the existence of the funds. 
7. The Court finds that the plaintiff received an 
inheritance from his mother's estate in late 1985 in the amount 
of $8,100.00, which funds were deposited into savings, and at all 
times thereafter the parties maintained a savings account in 
excess of the amount of those funds. 
8. At all times during the course of the litigation the 
plaintiff has maintained that he will not pay any support in the 
form of alimony, and objects to any continuing order or permanent 
alimony. 
9. The major contested issues are confined to three main 
issues. They are as follows: 
(a) Should an award of permanent alimony be rendered, 
and if so, in what amount? 
(b) Has the $8,100.00 from the plaintiff's inheritance 
from his mother been commingled into the family estate and lost 
its separate identity, or should it be awarded exclusively to the 
plaintiff? 
(c) Is the defendant entitled to reasonable attorney's 
fees from the plaintiff as a result of the protracted nature of 
the litigation? 
DAVIS V. DAVIS PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In resolving the foregoing issues, the Court hereby orders, 
adjudges and decrees, as follows: 
i. The defendant is entitled to permanent alimony in the 
amount of $200.00 per month. 
2. The plaintiff is entitled to the return as an equitable 
distribution of his inherited proceeds in the amount of 
($8,100.00N 
3. The defendant is entitled to payment of attorneyfs fees 
due to the fact that the Court specifically finds the protracted 
nature of this litigation was a result of the plaintiff's effort 
to secret $10,100.00 in cash, and further his failure to 
cooperate with discovery and truthfully respond, and thus the 
defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the 
amount of $6,800.00, and Judgment may be rendered on that amount 
against the plaintiff. 
4. Each party is permanently enjoined from harassing, 
vexing, or annoying the other party in any way. 
5. Further, the Court finds that other personal property 
considered by the Court for division should be divided as 
follows: 
(a) The Court adopts Exhibit 17-D as to the division 
to the plaintiff and defendant of the items contained thereon. 
(b) The items on the schedule referred to during the 
trial as Exhibit "A", which was attached to the Financial 
DAVIS V. DAVIS PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Declarations shall be awarded as contained on that schedule, with 
the following exceptions: The plaintiff is awarded the old 
found; the-personal .books referred to as "his11 personal books; 
on&Srof the federation rock cases; the iron wall picture he built; 
the three aluminum plaque cars he created; and the orange 
picture. All other items not specifically referred to herein are 
awarded to the party in possession of said items. 
The defendant's attorney is requested to prepare Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce consistent with 
these findings, other matters resolved by agreement or 
appropriately pled, and is to prepare those Findings to indicate 
that the Decree of Divorce is granted to the defendant on her 
Counterclaim, since only the defendant presented evidence as to 
jurisdiction and grounds. 
Dated this £p day of October, 1988. 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
Attorney for Defendant 
318 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BERT CHARLES DAVIS, ) 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
MARJORIE DAVIS, ) Civil No. D87-3653 
Defendant. ) Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on September 
27, 1988, the plaintiff appearing pro se and the defendant 
appearing with her counsel, Phillip W. Dyer. The parties 
stipulated to certain matters, called witnesses, presented 
evidence, testimony and exhibits, and argued the issues to 
the Court. The Court having taken the matter under 
advisement and having issued its Memorandum Decision dated 
October 5, 1988, and good cause appearing therefore, now 
makes and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant is, and was for three (3) months prior to 
the filing of her Answer and Counterclaim herein, a bona fide 
1 
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife and 
were married on October 13, 1961. The parties were married 
just under twenty-seven years at the time of trial. 
3. At the time of the marriage, plaintiff was twenty 
(^TF^MtgB^ of J&g^ and defendant was fifteen (15) years of 
age. 
4. There have been three (3) children born as issue of 
the parties' marriage, all of whom were emancipated at the 
time of trial. 
\dN%£TT~mViG plaiivtri^^ resddaaee* ami 
dated other woHSh. 
^ Plaintiff is currently employed at Kennecott Copper 
Corporation and earns approximately $1,710.00 per month in 
/ 
gross income. J"*-
|^. Defendant is currently employed as a seamstress for 
Osborn Apparel in Magna, Utah, and earns approximately 
$856.00 per month in gross income. 
8. Plaintiff has been employed at Kennecott Copper 
Corporation for twenty-nine (29) years, except for the period 
beginning in August 1985 through April of 1987 during which 
time plaintiff was unemployed due to a suspension of 
continued operations and furloughing of employees by 
Kennecott Copper Corporation. During the time plaintiff was 
furloughed, he attended Salt Lake Community College and 
ultimately obtained an Associate Degree from that 
institution. 
9. Defendant's educational background is limited to 
graduation from high school. 
10. During the parties' marriage, defendant's 
employment history outside the home has been limited 
exclusively to work as a seamstress at Osborn Apparel. 
Otherwise, defendant was a homemaker until such time as the 
parties' youngest child obtained school age. Defendant 
currently has no skills or job experience other than work as 
a seamstress. 
11. Defendant is currently experiencing health problems 
that require monthly prescriptions and treatment for 
hypertension. Additionally, defendant is receiving 
psychological counseling for stress and related psychological 
distress. 
net monthly income,* after deduction for Federal and State 
_ ^ — — . — - „ ^ _
 M^z$k 
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13. Plaintiff did not present any evidence concerning 
his net monthly income or his monthly expenses other than the 
fact that he pays for most of his monthly expenses by cash 
except for such items as rent, utilities and professional 
services which he pays by check, 
14. During the parties' marriage, their lifestyle 
included taking family vacations on a regular basis and 
attendance at cultural activities, sports events and other 
opportunities consistent with their income. Plaintiff is 
currently entitled to five (5) weeks paid vacation time on an 
annual basis from his employment. 
15. At all times during the course of these 
proceedings, plaintiff has asserted and maintained he will 
not pay any support to defendant in the form of alimony and 
objects to any continuing order of permanent alimony as being 
immoral. 
16. Plaintiff received an inheritance from his mother's 
estate in late 1985 in the amount of $8,100.00, which funds 
were deposited into a savings account containing marital 
funds. The parties have thereafter maintained, at all times, 
a savings account balance in excess of the amount of those 
funds but no records were kept delineating which funds were 
marital funds and which funds were inherited funds. 
17. Plaintiff is capable of paying support to defendant 
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by virtue of his income and apparent minimal expenses. 
18. During the course of this litigation, plaintiff has 
employed two (2) separate attorneys, has failed to be 
forthright and candid in disclosing his assets and has failed 
to realistically evaluate this case for settlement. More 
specifically, the plaintiff intentionally failed to disclose 
$10,100.00 that was converted into travelers' checks prior to 
commencement of this action and did not disclose the funds 
through routine discovery. As a result of plaintiff's 
misconduct, defendant has necessarily incurred substantial 
attorney's fees and costs due to the extensive discovery and 
investigation needed to determine the existence of these 
funds. 
19. The defendant has outstanding attorney's fees in 
the approximate sum of $6,800.00 which were necessarily 
incurred by defendant to discover the funds secreted by 
plaintiff and to pursue her entitlement to alimony. 
20. The Court specifically finds the attorney's fees 
incurred by defendant were reasonable in the total amount 
charged, the rate charged to defendant, the time spent on the 
case and the complexity of the issues involved in the case. 
The Court further finds that $75.00 per hour is a rate 
customarily charged in Salt Lake City, Utah, and is 
reflective of the parties ability to pay. 
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21. The Court finds plaintiff is entitled to the return 
of his inherited proceeds in the amount of $8,100.00 as an 
equitable distribution of marital assets. 
22. The parties have a marital residence with no 
mortgage or debt thereon and which is appraised at 
$89,000.00. The parties have agreed to list the home for 
sale and to split the net proceeds from the sale, after 
payment of all reasonable costs of sale, including but not 
limited to, real estate commissions, closing costs and 
points. The parties further agreed that defendant may have 
exclusive use of the marital residence until such time as the 
residence is sold and defendant shall maintain said residence 
at her own expense. The parties also agreed to equally share 
the real property taxes and insurance costs on said residence 
until the same is sold. 
23. The plaintiff has a vested retirement with his 
employer and the parties have agreed that defendant shall be 
awarded one-half (1/2) of the retirement account that accrued 
during the marriage with the same to be divided by issuance 
to plaintiff's employer of a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code. 
24. Plaintiff has a whole life insurance policy with a 
cash value of $1,500.00 and the parties agreed that defendant 
shall be awarded $750.00 representing her share of the cash 
6 
value. 
25. The parties have experienced difficulties in 
communicating with each other resulting in arguments and 
altercations and each party should be permanently enjoined 
from harassing, vexing or annoying the other party in any 
way. 
26. The Court finds the partes have obtained the 
following personal property: 
Marital Assets Value 
1986 GMC Pickup Truck $7,850.00 
Snowmobiles and Trailer 900.00 
Motorcycles and Trailer 1,200.00 




Household Goods 5,000.00 
TOTAL $41,750.00 
27. The Court finds that plaintiff should be awarded 
the following personal property: 
Asset Value 
1986 GMC Pickup Truck $7,850.00 
Snowmobiles and Trailer 900.00 





Additionally, plaintiff should be awarded the old Hawaiian 
pinball machine, the brass candles and candleholders, if 
found, the personal books referred to as "his" personal 
7 
books, one of the federation rock cases, the iron wall 
picture he built, the three (3) aluminum plaque cars he 
created, and the orange picture. 
28. The Court finds that defendant should be awarded 
the following personal property: 
Asset Value 
1979 Pontiac $2,500.00 
Household Goods 5,000.00 
Two Motorcycles & Trailer 900.00 
Cash 8,425.00 
TOTAL $16,825.00 
29. The Court finds that any specific items of personal 
property not previously awarded in paragraphs 27 and 28 
heretofore shall be divided pursuant to Trial Exhibit A, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and 
incorporated herein by this reference. Further, all items of 
personal property not specifically referred to hereinabove or 
on Trial Exhibit A are awarded to the party in possession of 
said items. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court having made its Findings of 
Fact now makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, the same to 
become final upon entry. 
2. Defendant is in need of financial assistance and 
8 
support from plaintiff to meet her monthly expenses and to 
assist her in approaching the lifestyle to which the parties 
had become accustomed during the marriage and plaintiff is 
capable of financially contributing to defendant's support, 
and it is fair and equitable that plaintiff should be ordered 
to pay alimony to defendant in the monthly sum of $200.00. 
Further, it is fair and equitable that plaintiff's obligation 
to pay alimony to defendant should be a permanent order of 
this Court due to the length of the marriage, the parties 
respective ages at the time of the marriage, defendant's 
limited education and job experience and defendant's limited 
prospects for employment at a greater rate of pay. The 
foregoing order of permanent alimony is, however, subject to 
all applicable provisions of law concerning modification of 
the alimony award or termination of the alimony award in the 
event the Court were to determine defendant violated the 
provisions of U.C.A. 30-3-5(6) (1953) concerning remarriage 
or residing with a person of the opposite sex or in the event 
defendant died. 
3. The Court concludes it is fair and equitable that 
plaintiff be awarded the inheritance he received from his 
mother' estate in 1985. The Court further concludes that it 
is fair and equitable that the personal property of the 
parties should be awarded as follows: 
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TO BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF: 
1986 GMC Pickup Truck $7,850-00 
Snowmobiles and Trailer 900-00 





Additionally, plaintiff should be awarded the old Hawaiian 
pinball machine, the brass candles and candleholders, if 
found, the personal books referred to as "his" personal 
books, one of the federation rock cases, the iron wall 
picture he built, the three (3) aluminum plaque cars he 
created, and the orange picture. 
TO BE AWARDED TO DEFENDANT: 
1979 Pontiac $2,500.00 
Household Goods 5,000.00 
Two Motorcycles & Trailer 900.00 
Cash 8,425.00 
TOTAL $16,825.00 
4. The Court concludes that the division of personal 
property set forth in paragraph 3 of these Conclusions of Law 
represents an equitable distribution and return of 
plaintiff's inherited funds by virtue of his receiving 
$8,100.00 more of the parties' personal property. 
5. It is fair and equitable that the division of 
personal property shall be in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
these Conclusions of Law and the remaining personal property 
shall be divided pursuant to Trial Exhibit A, a copy of which 
10 
is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by 
this reference. Any items of personal property not divided 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conclusions of Law or Trial 
Exhibit A shall be awarded to the party in possession of said 
items. 
6 • It is fair and equitable that the parties agreement 
concerning sale of the marital residence be approved by the 
Court and the Court so approves said agreement and it should 
be ordered that the parties should list the home for sale and 
further should split the net proceeds from the sale, after 
payment of all reasonable costs of sale, including but not 
limited to, real estate commissions, closing costs and 
points. The defendant should have exclusive use of the 
marital residence until such time as the residence is sold 
and defendant should maintain said residence at her own 
expense. The parties should equally share the real property 
taxes and insurance costs on said residence until the same is 
sold. 
7. It is fair and equitable that the parties agreement 
concerning plaintiff's retirement account be approved by the 
Court and the Court so approves said agreement and it should 
be ordered that defendant should be awarded one-half (1/2) of 
plaintiff's retirement account that accrued during the 
marriage with the same to be divided by issuance to 
11 
plaintiff's employer of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code. 
8. It is fair and equitable that the parties agreement 
concerning plaintiff's life insurance policy be approved by 
the Court and the Court so approves said agreement and it 
should be ordered that the defendant shall be awarded $750.00 
representing her share of the cash value of said life 
insurance policy. 
9. The defendant has necessarily incurred attorney's 
fees and costs in the sum of $6,800.00 and the foregoing 
attorney's fees and costs were reasonable in amount charged 
and time expended and it is fair and equitable that plaintiff 
be ordered to pay $6,800.00 in attorney's fees and costs and 
judgment should be entered against plaintiff in that amount. 
MADE AND ENTERED this day of , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
District Court Judge 
A-DAVIS.fin.DIV5 
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Bert C. Davis 
Attorney for the pi antiff 
6885 So. Redwood Rd. // 1209 
West Jordon, Utah 84084 
565-0716 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL. DISTRICT COURT IK AND FOR 
SAL? LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
rEPT CHARLES DAVIS, ) 
} 
Fie i M i f f , } FRE-TFIAL ORDER 
» 
V£ . 
KAfcJOME DAVIS, ) Civil No. D87-3655 
; 
Defendant. ) Juooe David S. Younc 
) 
IT IS ORDERED: 
I. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDIN3S: 
This is an action for dissolution of the marriage 
between the parties, a division of property and award of 
support. 
II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES: 
A. Plaintiff's Position: Defendant should receive 
temporary' alimony of $100.00 per month for one (1) year and 
$50.00 per month for two (2) years thereafter, with alimony 
to terminate at that point in time. Plaintiff should be 
awarded personal property as shown on Exibit A attached hereto. 
Plaintiff should be oiven credit for damaaes to 
personal property. Plaintiff should receive $9,200.00 of 
cash on hand as inherited and separate property. 
B. Defendant's position: Plaintiff should pay 
permanent alimony of $250.oo per month. The personal 
property should be divided as shown on Exhibit B attatched 
hereto with the exception of the camper which should be 
awarded to plaintiff. Defendant should be awarded judgment 
against plaintiff in the sum of $8,500.00 representing one-
half (1/2) of funds plaintiff obtained and possessed during 
pendency of these proceedings. Each party should be awarded their respective 
vehicles. Tne cash value in plaintiff's life insurance policy should 
be divided equally. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay defendant's 
attorney's fees and costs. 
III. MATTERS AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES: 
Tne parties have previously stipulated to the following matters: 
1. The marital residence located at 2660 South 8000 West 
Magna, Utah, has an appraised value of $89,000.00. The home shall 
be listed for sale and the net proceeds (after deducting all costs of 
sale including but not limited to points, closing costs and real estate 
broker's commissions) should be divided equally. Plaintiff shall 
have exclusive use of the residence until it is sold and shall assume all 
9 
maintenance obligations on the residence. The property taxes 
and insurance costs on the residence shall be borne by the party that 
occupies the house. 
2. The amount of plaintiff's retirement accuring during 
the marriage shall be divided equally by issuance of a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code. 
3. The defendant shall be awarded $750.00 representing her 
one-half (1/2) of the cash value in plaintiff's life insurance policy. 
IV. FACTS NOT TO BE CONTESTED: 
The following facts are not at issue: 
1. The parties have been married for approximately 
twenty-seven (27) years and have three (3) adult children. 
2. Plaintiff was nineteen (19) years of age and defendant 
was fifteen (15) years of age at the time of marriage. Plaintiff is 
currently forty-seven (47) years of age and defendant is forty-two (42) 
years of age. 
3. Plaintiff's hourly wage is $9.94 per hour. 
4. Plaintiff had $17,100.00 in traveler's checks during 
these proceedings. 
5. Plaintiff currently has $10,100.00 left of the $17,100.00 in 
traveler's checks. 
6. Plaintiff received and inheritance of $8,100.00 in cash in 1985. 
V. ISSUES OF FACT TO BE LITIGATED: 
The following issues of facts, and no others, remain to be litigated 
at trial: 
1. The ability of defendant to provide for her support. 
2. The ability of plaintiff to provide support for defendant. 
3. Has plaintiff's inheritance been cc-mingled/lost its identity. 
4. The value of the personal property of the parties. 
5. Tne necessity and reasonableness of defendant's attorneyfs fees 
incurred in prosecuting/defendant this matter. 
6. The inheritance of money of defendant's cash gift to the parties, 
used to purchase a 35 MM camera and accessories. 
7. Defendant's net monthly income of $710.74 is questionable and 
her monthly expenses of $995.96 are also questionable. 
8. Damages done by the defendant to personal property of Plaintiff and 
other person be awarded. 
9 Division of property. 
10. The defendant adjustment of income since the proceedings. 
4 
VI. ISSUES OF LAW TO BE LITIGATED: 
The following issues of law, and no others, remain to be 
]itigated at trial: 
1. Should plaintiff be ordered to pay to defendant 
alinony? 
a. What amount of el irony is fair and 
eaui table? 
b. For what period of time should plaintiff 
be required to p>ay alimony? 
2. Is plaintiff entitled to an award of inherited 
property under the guidelines of Horter.sen v. Kortensen, 8S 
Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah Sup. Ct. , August 36, 1586). 
3. How should the Court divide the personal 
property of the parties? 
4. Should defendant* be ordered to pay tc plaintiff ' 
her attorney's fees and costs incurred herein? 
The foregoing admissions, issues of facts and law shall 
be binding upon the p>arties, and this Order shall supplement 
the pleadings and govern the course of the trial of this 
case, unless modified to prevent manifest injustice. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
District Court Judge 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
Attorney for Defendant 
318 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)363-5000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





i DECREE OF DIVORCE AND 
| JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. D87-3653 
i Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on September 
27, 1988, the plaintiff appearing pro se and the defendant 
appearing with her counsel, Phillip W. Dyer. The parties 
stipulated to certain matters, called witnesses, presented 
evidence, testimony and exhibits, and argued the issues to 
the Court. The Court having taken the matter under 
advisement and having issued its Memorandum Decision dated 
October 5, 1988, and having heretofore made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant is awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
1 
plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, the same to 
become final upon entry, 
2. The parties are ordered to list the marital 
residence for sale and to split the net proceeds from the 
sale, after payment of all reasonable costs of sale, 
including but not limited to, real estate commissions, 
closing costs and points. The defendant is awarded exclusive 
use of the marital residence until such time as the residence 
is sold and defendant is ordered to maintain said residence 
at her own expense. The parties are both ordered to equally 
share the real property taxes and insurance costs on said 
residence until the same is sold. 
3. The plaintiff has a vested retirement with his 
employer and the defendant is awarded one-half (1/2) of the 
retirement account that accrued during the marriage with the 
same to be divided by issuance to plaintiff's employer of a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order pursuant to the Internal 
Revenue Code and defendant's counsel shall submit a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order to the Court for signature. 
4. Plaintiff has a whole life insurance policy with a 
cash value of $1,500.00 and the defendant is awarded $750.00 
representing her share of the cash value in said policy. 
5. The parties are both permanently enjoined from 
harassing, vexing or annoying the other party in any way. 
2 
6. The plaintiff is awarded the following personal 
property: 
Asset Value 
1986 GMC Pickup Truck $7,850.00 
Snowmobiles and Trailer 900.00 





Additionally, plaintiff is awarded the old Hawaiian pinball 
machine, the brass candles and candleholders, if found, the 
personal books referred to as "his" personal books, one of 
the federation rock cases, the iron wall picture he built, 
the three (3) aluminum plaque cars he created, and the orange 
picture. 
7. The defendant is awarded the following personal 
property: 
Asset Value 
1979 Pontiac $2,500.00 
Household Goods 5,000.00 
Two Motorcycles & Trailer 900.00 
Cash ^ ^ 8,425.00 
TOTAL ^ " $16,825.00 
8. Any specific items of personal property not 
previously awarded in paragraphs 6 and 7 heretofore are 
ordered to be divided pursuant to Trial Exhibit A, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein 
by this reference. Further, all items of personal property 
3 
not specifically referred to hereinabove or on Trial Exhibit 
A are awarded to the party in possession of said items. 
9. The plaintiff is awarded the inheritance he received 
from his mother' estate in 1985 by virtue of his receiving 
$8,100.00 more of the parties' personal property. 
10. The plaintiff is ordered to pay permanemt alimony 
to defendant in the monthly sum of $200.00. 
11. The plaintiff is ordered to pay $6,800.00 in 
defendant's attorney's fees and costs and judgment is entered 
against plaintiff in the sum of $6,800.00 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
District Court Judge 
a-Davis.dec.DIV5 
MARJORIE DAVIS INCOME BASED ON 1987 NET INCOME OFF LAST YEARS PAY 
NET INCOME * 10974. 55 
DIVIDED BY 12 MO. 12 
EQUALS * 914.55 PER MO. 
NOTE; THIS IS NOT FOR FULL TIME HOURS WORKED. 
PERT C. DAVIS INCOME BASED ON 1987 MET INCOME OFF LAST YEARS PAY 
NET INCOME $1230 PER MO. BASED ON *1137. DIVIDED BY 4 
WEEKS EQUALS *2&4. TIMES 4.3 EQUALS SI230 PER MONTH. 
PLAINTIFF * 1230. 
DEFFNDANT $ 930. 
DIFFERENCE * 316. 
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3. There is no indication of what disposition was 
made of that charge. One Porsche, 526 P 2d at 
917. 
4. Without legal analysis or authority, Honda con-
tends that One Pontiac is not controlling because 
the decision post-dates the trial. We decline to 
enter into a detailed analysis of this issue, State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984), except 
to say that Honda's contention is without merit. 
See Chevron Oil Co v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-
07 (1971) For cases construing similar statutory 
language see, c g . U S v One (1) 1982 28* Inter-
national Vessel, 741 F 2d 1319 (11th Cir. 1984); 
U S v One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th 
Cir 1978), U S v One 1975 Ford Pickup Truck, 
558 F2d 755 (5th Cir. 1977); Calero-Toledo v. 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
Cite as 
55 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Joan EAMES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Emerson EAMES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Davidson, Orme and Garff 
No. 860019-CA 
FILED: April 9, 1987 
FIRST DISTRICT 
Hon. Omer J. Call 
ATTORNEYS: 
George W. Preston for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Gordon J. Low for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
The trial court granted a divorce to plaintiff 
Joan Eames from defendant Emerson Earnes. 
The Judgment and Decree provided for a 
distribution of property and an award of 
alimony to plaintiff. On appeal, defendant 
seeks a reversal of the trial court's judgment 
as it relates to alimony and distribution of 
property. We affirm. 
The parties were married for thirty years 
with three children bom to the union. At the 
time of trial in January, 1984, the youngest 
child was 18 years old and resided with plai-
ntiff: in the family home while she
 7 attended 
college.' Defendant jiarfjmoyfed tib a f f e r e n t j 
residence: Plaintiff was employed, as a depa-
rtment manager and clerk for a large store and 
her gross income was approximately*$10,000 
per year. She had been employed during 
most of the marriage in unskilled or untrained 
type positions. Mr. Eames was a manufact-
uring engineer with Morton-Thiokol and had 
worked with that corporation since 1962. His 
gross income was approximately $34,000 per 
year. Because the parties placed widely 
varying valuations on their items of personal 
property, the trial judge made the division 
without finding specific values for each item 
In addition to her share of the personal pro-
perty, the plaintiff received her equity in a 
partnership consisting of members of her 
paternal family (Five Way Partnership), pre-
vious distributions from this partnership, her 
inherited property, gifts from her father, and 
a one-half interest in the family home. 
Plaintiff was given the right to live in the 
home until February 1, 1989, or until it was 
sold by agreement of the parties, whichever 
came first. While in the home, Mrs. Eames 
was responsible for payment of taxes, insur-
ance, and mortgage installments. Defendant 
received his share of the personal property, his 
separate bank account, the inheritance from 
his parents, and an undivided one-half inte-
rest in the family home less the mortgage 
indebtedness at the time of trial. Each party 
received one-half of the other's retirement 
benefit, to be paid when it was received. This 
provision was subject to the approved formula 
which considers the number of years worked 
during the marriage Defendant's retirement 
was vested while the plaintiffs was not, his 
being much more valuable than hers 
Plaintiff was awarded alimony in the 
amount of $450 00 per month so long as the 
youngest child successfully pursued a full time 
college education, lived in the family home, 
remained single, or reached the age of 21 
years. Then alimony was reduced to $300 00 
per month and would remain so until plaintiff 
reached the age of 65 years. At that time 
alimony would terminate. 
Defendant claims error in the distribution of 
the real and personal property of the parties 
and in the award of alimony. The trial court 
has statutory authority to decree an equitable 
distribution of property in a divorce action 
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1986). 
In the case of King v. King, 111 P.2d 715 
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court emph-
asized that it would accord considerable def-
erence to the trial court's judgment and treat 
its findings with a presumption of validity. An 
appellant has the burden of showing that the 
trial court's award "works such a manifest 
injustice or inequity as to clearly be an abuse 
of that broad discretion [in adjusting the fin-
ancial needs and property interests of the 
parties]. * 
The trial 'jecord exposes
 tthe disparities 4n 
education, income," and earning potential 
between the parties. The record also reveals 
that any future income from the Five Way 
r^. ~Amnu#* n#«h Ctu\* Annotations. consult Code* Co'* Annotation Service 
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Partnership will be considerably less than 
defendant asserts. Defendant's claimed right 
to receive interest on his one-half interest in 
the home's equity for the period until Febr-
uary 1, 1989, is offset by the plaintiffs need 
to provide shelter and support for the parties* 
youngest child while she attends college. It is 
presumed the trial judge took these economic 
realities into consideration and, on balance, it 
can be said that he strove for an equitable 
distribution of the property. 
A recent Utah Supreme Court opinion 
concerning alimony, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 
96, 100 (Utah 1986), states that the purpose of 
spousal support is to 'enable the receiving 
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of lining enjoyed during the marriage 
and to prevent the spouse from becoming a 
public charge." The appellate courts should 
not interfere with such an award without a 
showing of a "clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion*. The Court in Paffel further set 
forth what must be considered by the trial 
court to avoid a challenge to the award as 
being an abuse of discretion. These factors-
are, (1) the financial condition and needs of 
the spouse claiming support, (2) the ability of 
that spouse to provide sufficient income for 
him or herself, and (3) the ability of the res-
ponding spouse {Mr. Eames] to provide the 
support. The trial record here shows that the 
court below carefully and properly considered 
the above factors. There was no abuse of 
discretion. Therefore, the award of alimony 
will not be disturbed. 
v
 Plaintiff requests attorney's fees on appeal. 
This issue is governed by R. Utah Ct. App. 
33(a) in rhat this Court may award costs and 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party if we 
determine the appeal to be either frivolous or 
brought for delav. The instant appeal is 
without merit but the record must be exam-
ined to determine whether or not it is frivolous 
or brought for delay. In Cady v. Johnson, 
671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), the Court 
implied the awarding of attorney's fees requ-
ired a finding that the suit was lacking in good 
faith and then defined "good faith" as: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety 
of the activities in question; 
(2) no intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and 
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of 
the fact that the activities in ques-
tion will, (sic) hinder, delay or 
defraud others. 
The Court recognizes the right of a party to 
argue in an attempt to correct what that party 
deems to be error in the court below. 
However, when there is no basis for the arg-
ument presented and when the evidence or law 
is mischaracterized and misstated, the Court 
must'Question the partyV.motives. The 
record shows the trial judge making Findings 
of Fact, dividing the property, and awarding 
support after a careful consideration of all the 
evidence. Defendant ignores this. Mr. Eames 
claims the trial court erred in awarding 
alimony to his wife. This attempt at depriv-
ation of alimony is contrary to the intent of Flet-
cher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 
1980), which was cited in defendant's brief. 
Surely a wife of thirty years deserves somet-
hing more than being cast adrift in the sea of 
economic uncertainty without some long term 
support from a husband with superior earning 
potential. Defendant refuses to accept the 
evidence presented concerning plaintiff's int-
erest in the Five Way Partnership. He conti-
nues to argue that the interest is of great and 
increasing value. He refuses to acknowledge 
the uncontroverted evidence that past distrib-
utions resulted from the sale of assets. He 
incorrectly argues for a valuation based upon 
the past rather than a valuation at the time of 
trial. Defendant also fails to recognize that he 
was awarded his own inheritance and fails to 
consider any income potential from that 
source. 
Defendant further misstates the law when he 
argues that the alimony award cannot be 
changed in the future. Utah Code Ann. §30-
3-5 (1986) specifically reserves jurisdiction to 
the trial court to "make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance 
of the parties—* 
The totality of defendant's argument 
compels this Court to find that he is attemp-
ting to take unconscionable advantage of his 
wife and that this appeal is frivolous. There-
fore, it fails to meet the standards of good 
faith and R. Utah Ct. App. 33(a) applies. 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court, 
award costs against the defendant, and 
remand to the trial court for a determination 
of plaintiff's attorney's fees which are 
ordered to be paid by the defendant. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
ORME, Judge: (Dissenting in part) 
I agree with the majority that the decision 
below must be affirmed. The trial court's 
disposition is well within the realm of reaso-
nableness and no abuse of discretion has been 
demonstrated. While I agree the appeal is not 
well taken, I am not convinced it was frivol-
ously taken and I dissent from the majority's 
imposition of attorney's fees against defen-
dant. 
Defendant had three major gripes with the 
trial court's decision. First, he did not think 
any alimony should have 
because- his, formex^wife ishib^ 
pinfulry: employed. Second?-
that even if some, award of» 
bepi;vawarded 
For complete Utah Code, Aftaotatkms, Code*Co'f AwKKitSon Servicr 
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appropriate, the court erred in providing that 
alimony continue until age 65 without regard 
to the possibility of remarriage, cohabitation, 
or other changed circumstance. Finally, he 
complained that although the trial court 
awarded him 50°7o of the equity in the marital 
home, it permitted plaintiff the right to live in 
the home for five years without any provision 
that interest would accrue on the equity share -
- the substantial investment - he had in 
the home. 
As to the first issue, the alimony awarded 
by the trial court is really on the low end of 
what is appropriate under the doctrine reiter-
ated in Paffel in view of the parties' ages and 
education, as well as the length of their mar-
riage and the substantial disparity in their 
incomes. It is a modest award and defendant 
cannot have reasonably thought there was any 
remote possibility of it being disturbed on 
appeal. 
The second issue is equally frivolous. Alt-
hough the decree recited that alimony would 
continue until defendant's former wife 
reached 65 and did not expressly refer to 
earlier termination upon her remarriage or 
other change of circumstance, defendant's 
concern is allayed by statute. Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-5(5) (1986) provides that 
unless a decree of divorce "specifically prov-
ides otherwise/ an award of alimony termin-
ates upon remarriage. Section 30-3-5(6) 
provides that alimony also terminates upon 
cohabitation unless the arrangement is free of 
sexual contact. At oral argument, defendant 
asserted that his concern was that the "until 
age 65" language might be deemed to mean 
the decree had "specifically provide[d] other-
wise" and required alimony be paid until age 
65 regardless of whether plaintiff remarried. 
Taking an appeal to obtain clarification and 
• eassurance on that point is clearly overkill. 
Plaintiff immediately conceded that under the 
statute alimony would of course terminate 
before age 65 should the plaintiff remarry or 
take on a male roommate. Timely objection 
to the phraseology of the decree, motion for 
clarification, or even a letter to opposing 
counsel would have readily elicited all the 
comfort defendant desired on this score. And 
as the majority points out, the continuing 
jurisdiction provision of 830-3-5(3) precl-
udes the conclusion that, even absent remarr-
iage or cohabitation, defendant would be 
obligated to keep paying alimony until his ex-
wife reached age 65 regardless of changes in 
the parties' circumstances. 
It is the third issue which, in my judgment, 
keeps defendant's appeal outside the realm of 
frivoiousness. When a residence is a major 
marital asset, it has become quite common to 
order it sold and the net proceeds divided. 
When the needs of the parties or their children 
require, it is equally common to defer the time 
of sale. In' the-latter situation, however, and 
For compkte Utah Coda AoMXitiom," 
especially for a period as long as five full 
years, it is to be expected that the equity share 
of the spouse who does not have the pre-saie 
use of the home will accrue interest at some 
reasonable rate, even though that interest 
might not be payable until the sale proceeds 
are available Such a provision is necessary to 
compensate the spouse who has to find som-
eplace else to live without access to his or her 
substantial investment which remains tied up 
in his or her former home. Failure to include a 
provision for interest would, in my judgment, 
ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion 
where the period during which sale is deferred 
is of more than incidental duration. Although 
1, like the majority, believe no abuse uas 
committed in this particular case, chiefly 
because the alimony award as such was quite 
meager, 1 believe defendant was entitled to our 
review of that issue to make sure this was 
indeed one of those rare situations where a 
"no interest" provision would pass muster. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Vanza Eckersley BOYLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark K. BOYLE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Bench. 
No. 860004-CA 
FILED: April 15, 1987 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Hon. Scott Daniels 
ATTORNEYS: 
Bruce E. Coke, Larry A. Kirkham for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Paul H. Liapis, Kent M. Kasting for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from a Decree of Divorce 
which distributed' property and debts between 
the parties, cancelled pre-marital note exec-
uted by defendant in favor of plaintiff, denied 
plaintiff alimony, and;granted a divorce to 
both parties. 
.The parties married in* 1974M*henvplairuiff 
was 56 years Old and defendant 63. Both hail 
prior marriages/ They separated in 1981 and 
Dotal* Code*Go's Annotation Service 
Code • Co 
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native, to remand the matter with instructions 
to the trial court to enter specific findings of 
fact. 
The Utah Supreme Court decision in Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), which 
was followed by this Court in Boyle v. Boyle, 
735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987), is controlling 
in the instant case. In Jones, the findings of 
the trial court merely described the property 
awarded to each party and failed to assign any 
specific or cumulative values. The Utah 
Supreme Court held although the trial court 
has a broad latitude of discretion in orders 
concerning property distribution, "the trial 
court must exercise its discretion in accordance 
with the standards that have been set by this 
Court/ Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074. One of those 
standards is the 'findings of fact must include 
valuation of assets in order to permit appellate 
review. * Boyle, 735 P.2d at 671. j 
The Jones Court attempted to compensate j 
for the lack of findings by reviewing the 
record for evidence of the values. However, 
the Court noted such "examination reveals 
that the valuation of the most important assets 
was hotly disputed by the parties. If the trial 
court accepted one set of values, the wife was 
clearly awarded too little; if another set was 
adopted, it is possible that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion." Jones, 700 P.2d at 
1074. 
In Jones and Boyle, the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court both ruled that despite 
the requirement of specific findings, the app-
ellants in both cases waived their claims since 
they were the parties who prepared the orig-
inal findings. Failing to prepare the findings to 
include values, they therefore waived challe-
nges on appeal. In the instant case, respondent 
plaintiff, not appellant defendant, prepared 
the findings. Therefore, the Jones exception 
does not apply. 
In the instant case, as in Jones, the valua-
tion of the most important assets is hotly 
disputed. If the trial court accepted one set of 
values, defendant was clearly awarded too 
little; if another set was adopted, the division 
could be equitable. Without specific findings 
of the values, we are unable to determine 
whether the trial court distributed the property 
equitably. We therefore remand for findings 
on the specific values of the assets. 
On remand, one of the key assets to be 
valued is Diana, Inc., the family business 
awarded to defendant. At trial, both parties 
testified the amount of money earned by and 
deposited into the account of Diana, Inc. 
during 1983 was approximately $750,000.00 to 
$1,000,000.00. At about the time the parties 
separated, defendant closed ail the corporate 
accounts and thereafter ceased all record 
keeping. Defendant ^ f i e d ^ t ^ .aJthough 
Diana, Inc. was once a profitable business, at 
the ..time of trial, it had anetworth of negaj. 
tive $50,400.00.1Plaintiff, unable to show 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, 
current value due to defendant's failure to 
keep records, did present some evidence of 
defendant's mismanagement and large expe-
nditures of corporate funds. In its findings, 
the trial court expressed concern that defen-
dant had failed to fully disclose the 
company's true value. 
Assets are usually valued at the time of the 
divorce decree. Berger v Bcrger, 713 P.2d 
695, 697 (Utah 1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 
P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980) However, where 
one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its 
value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the 
trial court may, under its broad discretion, 
value the property at an earlier date, i.e., 
separation. In re Marriage of Priddis, 132 Cal. 
App. 3d 349, 183 Cal. Rptr. 37, 39 (1982); In 
re Marriage of Stallcup, 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 
158 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1979). In view of the 
evidence adduced at trial, the trial court might 
therefore value Diana, Inc. as of the time the 
parties separated in November, 1983. 
Remanded. No costs awarded. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Defendant blamed the drastic reduction of value 
on recent repossessions and theft of most of his 
company vehicles and equipment, resulting in the 
loss of all major contracts. 
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decree of divorce. We affirm the property 
division and the award of alimony, but we 
reverse the award of attorney fees. 
Plaintiff Donna S. Tailey and defendant 
Glenn E. Tailey were married on June 14, 
1968. On December 14, 1983, plaintiff filed a 
complaint for divorce. 
At trial on August 27, 1984, the court rec-
eived evidence in the form of testimony and 
exhibits regarding the value of the marital 
assets, alimony, and attorney fees. The court 
issued a memorandum of decision on Septe-
mber 4, 1984. In its decision the court assi-
gned values and distributed the marital prop-
erty by awarding plaintiff, among other items, 
the parties* home, her personal property, and 
a portion of the furniture and fixtures in the 
home. The court awarded defendant, among 
other items, a boat, various stock, his retire-
ment plan, his personal property, and a 
portion of the furniture and fixtures, in the 
home. The court also awarded alimony and 
attorney fees to plaintiff. The court filed its 
formal findings, conclusions and decree on 
November 14,1984. 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial 
court erred in disproportionately assigning 
values to marital assets with insufficient evi-
dence. 
Determining and assigning values to marital 
property is a matter for the trial court, and 
this Court will not disturb those determinat-
ions absent a showing of clear abuse of disc-
retion. Ycldcrman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1983); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 
(Utah 1982). While defendant has concededly 
shown that the trial court valued certain items 
of marital property either contrary to or in the 
absence of his testimony, he has failed to 
show how this constitutes an abuse of discre-
tion. We therefore affirm the disposition of 
the marital property. 
Defendant next argues the trial court erred 
in awarding alimony to plaintiff. Defendant 
argues the testimony and evidence at trial 
failed to demonstrate plaintiffs actual need 
for alimony. 
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the 
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as 
possible the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from, 
becoming a public charge*. Eames v. Eames, 
735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Paf-
fel v. Paffcl, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 
1986)). This Court will not interfere with an 
award of alimony absent a showing of a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id. 
In Eames, this Court reiterated the three 
factors, previously adopted by the Utah 
Supreme .Court, that ,the trial court musj: 
consider in Warding; alimony; 1) jth^finanaal 
condition and needs o f the receiving spouse, 2) 
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a 
sufficient income for himself or herself,'and 3) 
the ability of the,paying spouse to provide 
INCE REPORTS g ^ g 
support. Id.; see also Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 
669 (Utah App. 1987). 
In the instant case, the parties were married 
for fifteen years. At the time of the divorce, 
plaintiff netted approximately $953.00 per 
month from her employment, while defendant 
earned approximately $2,018.00 net per 
month. Plaintiff testified her monthly expenses 
totaled $1,320.00. She asked for $500,00 per 
month permanent alimony. The court awarded 
her $250.00 per month for the first two years 
and $150.00 per month for the following three 
years. The record is clear the court considered 
the required factors, and we therefore affirm 
the award of alimony. 
Defendant finally argues the trial court's 
award of plaintiffs attorney fees was in error 
as the court failed to address the reasonable-
ness of the fees requested by plaintiffs 
counsel. 
"In divorce cases, an award of attorney fees 
must be supported by evidence that it is reas-
onable in amount and reasonably needed by 
the party requesting the award." Huck v. 
Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986). Alth-
ough plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated reas-
onable financial need, she failed to present 
evidence of the reasonableness of the fee req-
uested. At the close of plaintiffs case, her 
counsel proffered testimony and produced an 
exhibit itemizing the time' and costs expended 
by him, his associate, and his clerk, and the 
hourly rates charged for each. Conspicuously 
absent is any evidence "regarding the necessity 
of the number of hours dedicated, the reaso-
nableness of the rate charged in light of the 
difficulty of the case and the result accompli-
shed, and the rates commonly charged for 
divorce actions in the community . . ." Kerr v. 
Kerr, 610P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980). 
Because plaintiff failed in her burden of 
establishing the reasonableness of the attorney 
fees requested, we reverse the award of atto-
rney fees. Beads v. Bcals, 682 P.2d.862 (Utah 
1984); Delatore v. Delators 680 P.2d 27 (Utah 
1984). 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part. Parties 
to bear their own costs. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Juage 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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